Part Three – The Axis of Honour: Honour and Shame

Honour and Shame

Parts one and two of this series have focused on how both right- and left-wing ideologies prevent us from understanding terrorism. I’ve mentioned that if we remove ideology from our analyses, we have a much better chance at tackling the issue, both theoretically and practically.

I’ve also suggested, “honour” as one framework that can help us with that understanding, but that the sense in which we use the term is very specific.

The most succinct definition, for our purposes, comes from Agneta Fischer and her co-writers: “Honour has been described as a person’s self-respect or self-esteem, as judged through the person’s own eyes and through the eyes of others.”

This series is particularly interested in the nature of a society that places honour above all else – even human life.

While honour’s role in terrorism is the focus of these posts, it is also an extremely useful lens for examining other issues. In the future, I hope to write about honour’s influence on Australian Jews, and Jews around the world.

For now, however, let’s remain with suicide terrorism.

***

To begin with, it’s helpful to divide societies into two types: individualist and communalist.

Simply put, an individualist culture puts the individual at the centre, and it’s expected that his/her  personal goals generally comes first (within the bounds of the law and social convention).

People in communalist cultures, on the other hand,  prioritise the interests of the collective above those of the self.

So while an individual’s goals remain clearly defined in individualist cultures, in communalist cultures, the goal of the individual is often difficult to distinguish from the broader interests of the group.

The same applies to matters of identity. In communalist societies, the individual’s identity is inextricably bound to that of the group, maximising emotional dependence on the collective. Identity in individualist cultures, however, is far more autonomous.

What follows in communalist societies, is the tendency to form “in groups” and their natural opposite, “out groups.” In groups define membership within the collective and out groups delineate the “other.”

Such dualism is perhaps responsible for more absolute moral codes  in communalist societies (that demarcate starkly right from wrong and acceptable from unacceptable).

The individualist society, on the other hand, tends to emphasise choice in matters of personal morality.

There is considerable scholarship in the areas of psychology, anthropology, linguistics, history and gender studies that seem to reach cross-disciplinary consensus on this dichotomy, although terminology can vary (eg “honour societies” versus “dignity societies”).

One method some scholars have used to distinguish between communalist/honour societies and individualist societies is to establish the dominant values in each and then assign them to one camp or the other.

In this case, the term, “values” refers to the importance that groups or individuals place on issues such as threats to one’s and one’s loved ones’ well being. Concern is only felt about things that have value and such values in turn influence not only concerns but also the ways in which those concerns are expressed.

In an honour society, there is a communalisation of achievement and failure. So while in individualist societies, dishonour is conferred on one person, in collectivist societies, dishonour must be endured by the entire group.

This is why, in honour-based cultures, the individual cannot attain honour only through his/her own exertions, but also must do so through his/her position within the in group.

Fischer et al. again: “In honour cultures the focal value of honour is expressed in a concern with one’s public behaviour and with the avoidance of humiliation.” This explains why so much care is taken in preserving the reputation and honour of one’s family.

Individual and  family honour and reputation are indeed indistinguishable, rendering each family member dependent on the others for their status in the community.

Honour codes are also gender specific. Men are required to project authority and ensure their families’ well-being. Strength, toughness, and public displays of refusal to submit to public humiliation are integral to the honour society’s concept of masculinity.

Meanwhile, women’s honour is bound up with sexual shame which is expressed through modesty, and virginity before marriage. So if a woman is suspected of breaching her sexual honour code, the entire family’s honour is tainted. This is the most efficient way of explaining how people can kill female family members who are believed to have transgressed.

Despite the seeming rigidity of gender roles that reserve anger and toughness for men, research has demonstrated the existence of female anger responses to shame in honour societies as well.

This is potentially illuminating in the case of female suicide bombers in Palestine; however, as will be demonstrated in future posts, there is a greater likelihood that such self sacrifice is more likely the result of sexual shame – a very public (and deadly) way for the family and community to reclaim honour.

So, if it is possible to distinguish between differing cultural value systems, and that emotions are expressions of values, it therefore follows that different emotions will dominate in different cultures.

For example, if honour is central to a society’s functioning, emotions such as shame and pride take on greater significance.

The greater the importance of honour, the more extreme will be the reaction to its violation.

This is then compounded and magnified because an attack on one person’s honour is actually an attack on the entire family or larger social group. It’s no surprise, then, that the emotional response to actions that violate honour is overwhelmingly of anger and shame.

So how does any of this relate to suicide terrorism?

Scholar, Beth Baron writes: “Honour in the Arab world is thus a collective affair and helped define the parameters of the collective.”

In this light, we can understand how historical Arab/Muslim losses of such possessions as the Iberian peninsula are framed by radical elements, such as al Qaeda, as dishonourable. They preach a zero-sum game in which Western/Christian hegemony has come at the expense of the Arab/Islamic good name. Time is not necessarily a panacea for shame, either. That the loss of Moorish Iberia happened hundreds of years ago is irrelevant. Any insult that is remembered can be used as a galvanising force.

Similarly, the modernisation/westernisation of non-Arab Muslim countries such as Turkey and pre-revolutionary Iran are perceived by such Islamist radicals as having brought shame on the Islamic world.

It is important to note here, that prior to the enlightenment, honour was also integral to European society and martyrdom was certainly venerated.

That this is no longer the case is instructive. It is modernity that marginalises honour as the principal measure of worth.

***

This binary distinction between individualist and communalist societies seems reasonably straight forward. Western countries broadly fall into the individualist category, and the rest of the world would seem to fit into the communalist camp.

Unfortunately, nothing is ever that simple.

There is no such thing as a static society.  Globalisation, migration, communcations, and technological innovation mean that people from communalist societies bring their traditions to the West, while technology brings aspects of individualism everywhere else. Meanwhile, there are numerous internal struggles within various societies between those advocating communalist values and those who support individualist models.

It would be hard to argue that there is any society, today, that is purely communalist or individualist.

It is at these points of transition and conflict that the fault lines of radicalisation tend to be concentrated.

The next post will examine these fault lines, and how the collapse of old communalist structures, combined with incomplete progress towards modernity provide the necessary environment for radicalisation.

Once that has been established, it will become far easier to understand the circumstances that lead to the radicalisation of terrorists from Hamas, Egyptian JI, and al Qaeda.

But it will also demonstrate how Islam, rather than being a cause of the terrorism, has merely been reinvented and used as a tool in a war against threats to communal honour.

  • Share/Bookmark

Related posts:

  1. Part Four – The Axis of Honour: Honour, Modernity, and al Qaeda
  2. Part Two – The Axis of Honour: Honour, Communalism, and Islamist Suicide Terrorism
  3. Part Six – Axis of Honour Final: Palestinian Suicide Terrorism
  4. Part Five – Axis of Honour: Dislocation, Family, and Terror
  5. The Axis of Honour: Honour, Communalism, and Islamist Suicide Terrorism – Introduction

2 Responses to “Part Three – The Axis of Honour: Honour and Shame”

  1. What you describe as “honour” that sits at the core of communalist society sounds a lot like what we might call “face” when talking about Asian society. Indeed, as you point out, this is feature of most non-western societies.

    It would be interesting to understand how the Arab world differs from the Asian world in the way honour/face is preserved. Do you see the kamikaze (and perhaps hara kiri, although that’s a little more personal) as an Asian manifestation of the common principle of honour preservation?

    Support this comment Thumb up 0

  2. sensiblejew says:

    Hi David.

    What a fabulous comment!

    I agree that face and honour seem to be pretty much the same thing.

    I’m quite inexpert in East/South East Asian mores, and I would also love it if someone who did know something about them would answer your question about the differences and similarities with the Arab and Muslim world.

    As far as I know (and it’s very limited), kamikaze pilots were operating at a completely different level of fervour from today’s suicide bombers. They were not motivated by shame or anger, but rather by duty and fatalism. I actually think hara kiri has more in common, phenomenonologically speaking, with suicide bombing. Shame and honour reclamation are far more integral to this act than to the kamikazi attack.

    Again, I would love it if someone who knows more about the topic could elaborate on this, and correct me if I’m mistaken.

    Support this comment Thumb up 0